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COLLECTIVE MEMORY 
UNDER SIEGE
The case of 
‘heritage terrorism’
In the Age of Empire and the global reach of capitalism, there appears no ob-
ject that cannot be preserved, celebrated as a place of memory, perturbed by 
the logic of consumption—old buildings, theaters, historic town centers, mar-
ket places, museums, etc. have become saturated by a ‘tourism of collective 
memory’. In the global state of war, moreover, severe divisions along regional, 
national and local lines arise and these have deployed a politics of identity that 
intersects with ‘collective memory’, however the latter is dened. It is this con-
flation of collective memory, war and identity politics which I will address below. 
Since architectural collective memory is literally carved or erected in stone, 
and is thus tangible, monolithic, recognizable and permanent, it has been 
called the archetypal collective memory.1 If collective memory is under siege 
in the 2lst century, as will be argued here, what then does architectural collec-
tive memory actually signify? What fundamental assumptions about history, 
memory, identity, the nation underlie architectural practice when it ventures 
into the process of memorialization or stages theatrical performances of mate-
rial evidence and artifacts of recall?
“Since memory is actually a very important factor in struggle,” Michel Fou-
cault remarks, “if one controls people’s memory, one controls their dynamism. 
1 Jeffrey K. Olick: The Politics of Regret On Collective Memory and Historical Responsibil-
ity (New York, London: Routledge, 2007), p. 89.
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And one also controls their experience, their knowledge of previous struggles.”2 
If trauma of war is a special form of memory, registering affects but not mean-
ing, how then do architects negotiate the distinction between intangible memo-
ries and more formal acts of collective memorialization?3
Collective memory under siege requires sensitive interpretation of past 
events and imputed representations, as well as careful negotiations over the 
future of a nation or people. Never set in stone, it belongs to a eld of argumen-
tation located at the heart of modern ethics.
Part I: The rise of the ‘Memory Machine’
‘Memory’ as an intellectual debate was absent from the 1968 International 
Encyclopedia of Social Sciences published under the direction of David L. 
Sills; it did not appear in the collective work Faire de l’histoire edited in 1974 
by Jacques Le Goff and Pierre Nora; nor was it in 1976 among the Keywords 
assembled by the cultural historian Raymond Williams.4 Since then, however, 
the word ‘memory’ has become an obsession, diffused across cultural, social 
and political studies, the humanities and history, architecture and archaeology. 
But what does the word actually refer to? What kind of memory is at stake? If 
only individuals remember, then what is collective memory? Perhaps collective 
memory is a sensitivity instead of an operational concept, but then what does 
it sensitize us to and what does this imply for the building of memorials and the 
design of commemorative spaces?
In 1984, Nora described lieux de memoire [realms of memory], to be “an 
unconscious organization of collective memory” reflecting national, ethnic or 
group commonalities.5 His seven-volume attempt to catalogue every memory 
site in France reflects a certain nostalgia for a mythical ‘Frenchness’ lost in 
the process of modernization or eradicated in the uniformity of globalization.
This afrmative albeit backward looking approach to memory has spawned 
a veritable ‘memory machine’ retrieving and inventing traditions in many dif-
2 Michel Foucault: “Film and Popular Memory.” I:n Foucault Live (New York: Semiotext(e), 
1989), p. 92.
3 E. Ann Kaplan: Trauma Culture: The politics of Terror and Loss in Media and Literature 
(New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2005).
4 Enzo Traverso: Le passé, modes d’emploi histoire, mémoire, politique (Paris : La Fabrique 
éditions, 2005), p. 10.
5 Pierre Nora: “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire.” In: Representations 26 
(Spring, 1989), p. 23. See also Pierre Nora (ed.): Les Lieux de Mémoire, 7 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 
1984 – 1992).
PLE
N
U
M
 | 10
7
ferent places around the world, remarking on how the past has been remem-
bered or forgotten, how narratives have been constructed and landscapes of 
memory confabulated.6 ‘Memory tourism’ has transformed historic sites into 
museums, turned the ‘past’ into a consumer object to be recuperated and uti-
lized by commercial interests, and exploited as spectacles in theme parks and 
the cinema. Nora explains this obsession with memory by claiming that we 
speak so often of memory because there is so little of it.
As I argue in The City of Collective Memory, when a gap in time appears 
between the memory of an event and its actual experience, attempts are made 
to write these absent moments down, to preserve all the little known facts as 
much as possible, to erect monuments and establish commemorative celebra-
tions.7 A gap in time enables memory to act as resistance to the acceleration of 
time, or to be used as a tool in search of moral redemption for past grievances 
and regrets, or to provide a source of identity in an increasingly alienating 
and modernizing world. Such a gap in time appeared in the late 20th century, 
after a century of wars, totalitarian regimes, genocides and crimes against hu-
manity, when the last ‘witnesses’ of these atrocities and their memories were 
disappearing.8 In particular, the Holocaust of WWII has been positioned as the 
generator of the ‘memory machine’.
Berlin’s New Memory District
Much has been written about Germany’s efforts both to reconcile controver-
sial memories of its National Socialist past and its attempts to transform the 
center of Berlin into a new memory district with Daniel Libeskind’s design for 
the Jewish Museum, Peter Eisenman’s Memorial to Murdered Jews of Europe, 
and Peter Zumthor’s canceled Topography of Terror Documentation Center. In 
response, Karen Till asks the following question: 
If the Holocaust and its memory still stand as a test case for humanist 
and universalist claims of Western civilization, then one might argue 
that these place-making processes in Berlin are central symbolic and 
material sites of the crisis of modernity, uniquely embodying the contra-
6 Jan-Werner Müller: “Introduction.” In: Jan-Werner Müller (ed.): Memory & Power in Post-
War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past (Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 18.
7 M. Christine Boyer: The City of Collective Memory its Historical Imagery and Architec-
tural Entertainments (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1004).
8 James E. Young: The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1993).
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dictions and tensions of social memory and national identity in the late 
twentieth century and early twenty-rst.”9
Such a statement is beset with conceptual and interpretive contradictions and 
double standards which this essay tries to explore. How have humanist and 
universalist claims been deployed to keep amnesia not memory alive? What 
role does Western civilization play in the crisis of modernity, and does memory 
of the Holocaust act as a symbolic center for proclaimed clashes of civilizations 
in the Middle East today? If Berlin represents an ‘unstable optic identity’ of the 
nation10, as Till believes, what is the relationship between the eye of the specta-
tor and the logic of governmentality, between individual memory and collective 
memory, not just in Berlin but in any other memorial site?
Individual/Collective Memory
Since it is difcult to dene collective memory, some suggest abandoning its 
universalizing meaning replacing it with myth, tradition or commemoration. 
Others want to restrict its application to public discourse about the past or to 
narratives that speak in the name of collectivities. A third possibility is to limit 
its reference to mnemonic processes and practices such as memorial sites and 
public monuments.11
Everyone seems to agree that individual memory, the kind that people car-
ry around in their heads, differs from collective memory. The French sociolo-
gist Maurice Halbwachs, the founding father of contemporary memory stud-
ies, called the rst ‘autobiographical memory’. He believed, however, that the 
actual act of remembering, always takes place as group memory. He called 
this latter process of remembering together ‘collective memory’; it operates 
as a framework limiting and binding intimate acts of individual recall. So, he 
mused, “the mind reconstructs its memories under the pressure of society.” 12
Jan-Werner Müller points to another problem: the very language with which 
we discuss collective memory treats it as a ‘thing’ to be ‘shared’, ‘conscated’, 
‘repressed’, or ‘recovered’. Thinking that memory can be excavated or empiri-
cally known as a fact leads to instrumental control over its contents. Since it 
9 Karen E. Till: The New Berlin Memory, Politics, Place (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2005), p. 8 – 9.
10 Ibid., p. 5.
11 See note 1, pp. 33 – 34.
12 Maurice Halbwachs, in Lewis A. Coser (ed.): Maurice Halbwachs On Collective Memory 
(University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 53.
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is individuals, and not collectivities, that remember, unearthing personal mem-
ories generates too many therapeutic narrations or souvenirs. On the other 
hand, over-generalizing attempts to dene collective memory as a social fact 
fail to grasp how ‘memory’ actually is deployed in politics, and how control 
over individuals’ perception is achieved.13
Extending this troubled belief in excavation, a popular metaphor likens 
memory to a palimpsest: not a velum scraped clean for new use but horizontal 
strata of ancient texts brought to the surface in the present, revealing their 
simultaneous co-existence. Transferred to the urban fabric, the users of ‘pa-
limpsest’ assume that lost memories haunt a city’s collective memory, albeit 
in unsettled arrangements; they are ghosts of a restless past possessing some 
places.
Constructing places of memory is one way to work through such traumatic 
remains, to give shape to metaphysically absent but intensively felt fears and 
desires. It situates memories in place, stops their prowling around. People 
return to these haunted places, to make contact with their loss, places that 
contain unwanted presences and past injustices. In these situated places they 
work through contradictory emotions of shame, guilt, fear, sadness, longing, 
anxiety and they hope for a better future.14 Just how an absent, immaterial 
haunting signies individual or collective meaning remains a conundrum, 
however. 
Charles Maier claims “the surfeit of memory is a sign not of historical 
condence but a retreat from transformative politics.” The past is expected to 
redeem what the future may not be able to appease.15 Hence memory may have 
corrosive effects on political policies.
Part II: National identity and ‘Urbicide’
One of the problems haunting the term ‘collective memory’ is the issue of na-
tional identity. More than a hundred years ago, Ernest Renan pointed out that 
in the formation of national identity, remembrance and forgetting depend on 
each other, as shared memory and shared forgetting.16 With the rise of the na-
tion state, certain memories were mobilized while alternatives repressed and 
13 See note 6, p. 19.
14 See note 9, pp. 5 – 15.
15 Charles Maier: “A Surfeit of Memory? Reflections on History, Melancholy and Denial.” In: His-
tory & Memory, 5, 2 (1993), pp. 136 – 152. Quoted by Müller: Memory & Power in Post-War 
Europe, p. 16.
16 Ernest Renan: “What is a Nation?” (1920). Quoted by Müller, see note 6, pp. 12, 21, 33.
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regional differences assimilated. Ofcial narrations were and are idealized or 
invented and guarded with care: access to papers and national archives may 
be limited and allegiance to the hegemonic form of memory tightly controlled. 
There is no unitary collective mental set for the nation to possess, no ‘pristine 
memory’ to recall, only selected memory and numbing amnesia to manipu-
late as an instrument for better or worse by those in power, or those seeking 
power.17
Although counter-memory resists such restrictions and over-generaliza-
tions of national identity, offering competing pasts and narrating different 
events, it takes place within the framework of political power. Nor is counter-
memory, the recovery of suppressed memory, always liberating. When collec-
tive memory is conjoined with inflamed national passions, the memory-power 
nexus, residing in national and political memory and in civil and individual 
memory, becomes a highly contested terrain.18
Bogdan Bogdanovic, the architect, designer of monuments to the peaceful 
coexistence of different cultures and memories in post-war Yugoslavia, a for-
mer mayor of Belgrade, used the term ‘urbicide’ to describe war against cities 
in the Balkans during the 1990s. The sieges and bombardments of Vukovar, 
the World Heritage city of Dubrovnik and the historic centers of Sarajevo and 
Mostar received intentional attacks on their urban fabric because these cities 
were symbols of multiplicity —shared spaces of ethnic, cultural, religious, and 
civic values—the antithesis of the Serbian idea.19
Bogdanovic might also have used the word ‘memoricide’ to describe the 
murder of the past through the mutilation and eradication of geographical and 
architectural markers on the land. Memory was literally blown up during the 
Balkan wars as homes, neighborhoods, monuments, mosques, churches and 
cultural artifacts were erased, mnemonic devices such as maps redrawn to 
display an ethnically recongured future, and schoolbooks rewritten to tell 
17 Ibid., pp. 22, 29 – 30, 32.
18 Ibid., pp. 1 – 35.
19 “Urbanity is one ofthe highest abstractions of the human spirit [Bogdanovic claims]. To me, to be 
an urban man means to be neither a Serb nor a Croat, and instead to behave as though these dis-
tinctions no longer matter, as if they stopped at the gates of the city,” Interview with Bogdan Bog-
danovic, Serbian architect Rencontre européennei 7 (February, 2008); quotation: 1; “Urbicide’ was 
used by Marshall Berman to describe the willful use of the bulldozer by Robert Moses in the destruc-
tion of the South Bronx in the 1950s and 1960s,” Marshall Berman: All that is Solid Melts into Air: 
The Experience of Modernity (New York: Verso, 1983); “Urbicide” <en.wikipedia.org/wiki/urbicide>.
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ofcial tales.20 Ilana Bet-El claims the words ‘I remember’ and the dark recol-
lections that swirled around different speakers of remembrance in Yugoslavia 
turned into weapons of hatred, fear and then war, when collected together and 
carefully manipulated.21
‘Urbicide’ is a term that also applies to deliberate strategies of the Israeli 
army deploying bulldozers to systematically destroy water tanks, roads, elec-
trical generating plants, hospitals, schools, homes, cultural symbols in Ramal-
lah, Hebron, Bethlehem, Jenin and other Palestinian cities, plus the construc-
tion of a network of bypass roads to Israeli settlements on the West Bank. 
Deemed necessary for military self-defense, the elimination of such targets 
brings death and disease to innocent civilians. The war of the bulldozer is 
meant to drive Palestinian people away, to deny their collective, individual, cul-
tural and historical rights to the land, to place them in permanent poverty, to 
seclude them behind a wall and thus eradicate them from sight—an ‘unstable 
optic’ of national identity at play.22
‘Urbicide’ can also be applied to the war in Iraq where insurgents quick-
ly understood that the asymmetrical power of U.S. technological superiority 
might be thwarted, even neutralized, by taking refuge in complex and uncer-
tain urban terrains. They quickly moved the battleeld into Iraq’s sixteen 
largest cities. The conclusion is simple, as one U.S. military commander has 
said: “We have seen the future war, and it is urban.” Technological superiority, 
ghting war at a distance, reflects the U.S. military strategy of zero soldier 
deaths, while it increases the death of civilians and destruction of their cities 
as so much collateral damage.23
20 See note 6, pp. 9, 17.
21 Ilana R. Bet-El: “Unimagined communities: the power of memory and the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia.” In: see note 6, pp. 206 – 222.
22 Christain Salmon: “The Bulldozer War,” (May 20, 2002) <www.counterpunch.org/salm-
on0520.htm|>; Stephen Graham: “Clean Territory: Urbicide in the West Bank” 7 August 2002, 
<www:openDemocracy.net>; Rati Segal, Eyal Weizman, et al.: Territories Islands, Camps and 
Other States of Utopia (Berlin: KW – Institute of Contemporary Art, 2003); Sari Hana: “Target-
ing space through bio-politics: The Israeli colonial project” Palestinian Report 10, 32 (Feb 18, 
2001) www.palestinerepon.ps/article.php’?architect=267; Michael Sorkin (ed.): Against the Wall 
(New York, London: The New Press, 2005).
23 Peter W. Wielhouwer: “Preparing for Future Joint Urban Operations: The Role of Simulation 
and the Urban Resolve Experiment,” Command and Operations Group, USJFCOM/19 (2004). 
Quoted by M. Christine Boyer: “Urban Operations and Network Centric Warfare.” In: Michael 
Sorkin (ed.): Indefensible Space: The Architecture of the National Insecurity State (New York: 
Routledge, 2008), pp. 51 – 78.
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The Rhetoric of Memory and the Spectacle of War
The expression ‘heritage terrorism’ is exemplary of the rhetoric of memory. It 
was coined by Neal Ascherson of The Observer (March 2001) during the inter-
national outrage over Mullah Mohammad Omar’s wanton destruction of the 
giant Buddha statues carved into the rock cliffs of Bamiyan in the 2nd century 
A.D. and it includes the Mullah’s threat to eliminate all ‘offending’ pre-Islamic 
artefacts left in museums throughout Afghanistan.24 In defense of his decree, 
Mullah Omah proclaimed that the statues were not part of the beliefs of Af-
ghanistan, for there were no Buddhists left in the country; since they were only 
part of its history, “all we are breaking are stones.”25
Iconoclastic acts of cultural catharsis are as old as human hatred, and 
Ascherson claims the Taliban’s acts of vandalism against idols were motivated 
by religious and nationalistic aims.26 These blind zealots unleashed horren-
dous acts of ‘heritage terrorism’, he criticized, in order to prove that no other 
religion but Islam ever held sway in Afghanistan and delivered proof to future 
generations by eradicating all traces to the contrary. Lynn Meskell labels this 
‘negative heritage’, “a conflictual site that becomes the repository of negative 
memory in the collective imaginary.”27
While the outrage over the Buddha monuments added a new phrase to mili-
tary skirmishes, the meaning of ‘heritage terrorism’ may be far from clear. 
‘Terrorism’ is, after all, a virtually empty signier, one that can be lled with 
a variety of actions by non-state insurgents who ‘we’ dislike because ‘they’ 
violently oppose our way of life, our democracy, our civilization, our modernity, 
our freedom.28 Applying the adjective ‘heritage’ only reinforces this antago-
nism—our culture against theirs; two nihilisms at war, the East and the West. 
24 Neal Ascherson: “‘Heritage terrorism’ is a way of sticking two ngers to the West,” The 
Observern(Sunday, March 4, 2001); “Buddha Statues Destroyed Complete1y,” The News (March 
13, 2001): unpagenated.; Abid Ullah Jan: “Blowing statues vs. Satanic Savagery,” The Indepen-
dent Center for Strategic Studies and Analysis (June 26, 2001); Finbarr Barry Flood: “Be-
tween Culture and Culture: Bamiyan, Islamic Iconoclasm, and the Museum,” in The Art Bulletin 
84,4 (Dec. 2002), p. 651; Erik Nemeth: “Cultural Security: The Evolving Role of Art in Interna-
tional Security.” In: Terrorism and Political Violence 19 (2007), pp. 33 – 34; Patty Gerstenblith: 
“From Bamiyan to Baghdad: Warfare and the Preservation of Cultural Heritage at the Beginning 
of the 21st Century,” in Georgetown Journal of International Law (Winter, 2006), pp. 1– 58.
25 “All we are breaking are stones” in AFP (Feb 27, 2001); unpagenated.
26 See note 24.
27 Lynn Meskill: “Negative Heritage and past mastering in Archaeology.” In: Anthropological 
Quarterly 75 (2002), pp. 557 – 574, quote: p. 558.
28 Alain Badiou: Polemics (London: Verso, 2006), p. 19.
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Ignored in this struggle are complicated connections and unresolved ethical 
arguments in the denition of permissible wars and impermissible terrorism.
Critical remembering is seldom produced by war; instead a spectacular 
politics is put into play. The San Francisco group Retort argue that “The spec-
tacle is deeply (constantly) a form of violence—a repeated action against real 
human possibilities, real (meaning flexible, useable, transformable) represen-
tation, real attempts at collectivity.”29 The spectacle as image is key to the man-
agement of symbolic power, and this image-power nexus is highly concentrated 
in symbolic sites of memory: places, monuments, icons, logos, signs that rule 
over the cultural imaginary. Hence these icons are prone to destruction in war 
and reconstruction in peacetime.30
The visual immediacy of the Twin Towers with smoke billowing from their 
tops, imploding in real time and then remediated and multiplied through split 
screens, scrolling headlines, radio feeds and cellphones turned the event into an 
immediate spectacle. The perpetrators designed their acts as theatrical perfor-
mances, intentionally selecting the date and images to spellbind their audiences.31
‘Shock and awe’ tactics of the retaliatory and retributive Iraq war of 2003 
were likewise televised as image-spectacles seared into memory as perfor-
mances and repetitively looped in an endless war of images.32 The deployment 
of spectacular imagery, however, leaves vast realms of experience unnarrated 
and inaccessible to memory, allowing illusions and false options to prevail.
No one thought the World Trade Towers were a site of remembrance until 
their destruction on l l September 2001. These cultural icons became the tar-
gets of terrorist attacks because they dened the market culture and capitalist 
ideals of those who created them; they t the denition of ‘the spectacle’ like 
a glove.33 But in the wake of their collapse, the World TradeTowers site was 
mobilized for spectacular purposes and absorbed into the collective imaginary. 
29 Retort (Iain Boal, T.J. Clark, Joseph Matthews and Michael Watts): Afflicted Powers: Capital 
and Spectacle in a New Age of War (New York: Verso, 2005), p. 131.
30 The horrors of 9-11 were intentionally visible, marking them as distinct from other aerial at-
tacks. There were no cameras at Dresden, Hamburg, or Hiroshima. Retort, “Afflicted Powers The 
State, the Spectacle and September 11.” In: NLR 27 (May June 2004), pp. 5 – 21; Samuel Weber: 
“War, Terrorism, and Spectacle: On Towers and Caves.” In: The South Atlantic Quarterly 101, 3 
(Summer, 2002), pp. 449 – 458.
31 For more about the spectacle and the WTTs see Retort Afflicted Powers.
32 Richard Grusin: “Remediation and Premediation.” In: Criticism 46, 1 (Winter, 2004), pp. 
17 – 40.
33 The spectacle is capital accumulated to such a degree that it becomes an image. Guy Debord: 
Society of the Spectacle (Detroit: Black & Red, 1983) unpagenated.
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It quickly emerged as a tourist destination with the requisite paraphernalia of 
souvenirs, memory maps, and architecturally designed viewing stands.
Seven years after 9 –l l, no one is in control of the site, reconstruction is far 
behind schedule, and the design plagued with disappointments. The warring 
parties remain unappeased: families of the dead, business interests, govern-
ment agencies, the larger community.
Three tall towers designed by the world’s most renowned architects, Lord 
Norman Foster, Lord Richard Rogers and Fumihiko Maki, accompany those by 
David Childs’ Freedom Tower and 7 World Trade will stand along two sides of 
the site. The ensemble promises nothing more than a bland ofce park. Nor 
has Michael Arad’s and Peter Walker’s memorial plaza ‘Reflecting Absence’ 
of 2004 been without criticism. The design is a simple ‘forest grove’ of trees at 
street level contains two large voids marking the famous footprints. At the cen-
ter of each void is a recessed pool of water lled by a cascade flowing down its 
perimeter walls. Surrounding the pool will be a continuous ribbon of names of 
the dead arranged in no particular order. “Standing there at the water’s edge, 
looking at a pool of water that is flowing away into an abyss,” Arad and Walker 
claim, “a visitor to the site can sense that what is beyond this curtain of water 
and ribbon of names is inaccessible.”34 However, some family members want 
the memorial to be above ground rather than sunken thirty feet below, while 
government leaders have placed a cap on cost overruns, causing further de-
sign alterations to come. Of course, any attempt to preserve a site necessarily 
ignores other uses, other engagements with meaning and memory. Arad poi-
gnantly remarked as his plans were unveiled: “Every way you nd to resolve 
this satises some but causes pain and anguish to others.”35
Part III: Collective Memory and Amnesia
Rwanda
How do countries such as Rwanda remember the brutal and painful history of 
genocide between 1990 and 1994 that killed nearly a million people, mostly Tut-
si, without rekindling divisions that led to the killings? How do Rwandans keep 
alive an understanding of how and why these killings occurred? Pat Caplan, an 
anthropologist from the U.K., traveled to Rwanda in search of answers, visiting 
34 Michael Arad and Peter Walker: Statement “Reflecting Absence” Lower Manhattan Develop-
ment Corporation <http://www.wtcsitememorial.org/n7_mod.html>
35 Michael Arad: “January 14, 2004”. Quoted by Martin C. Pedersen: Goodbye Memory Founda-
tions, Hello Reflecting Absence. Urban Journal posted January 21, 2004. <http://sixthcolumn.
blogspot.com/2005/06/reflecting-absence-indecency-of-91 1.html>
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four major genocide memorials and many smaller sites of memory.36 She found 
the Kigali Genocide Memorial typical of many Holocaust museums, done very 
professionally and movingly. 
In addition to the museums, the sites of genocide function as memorials. 
Since Tutsi death squads lured Hutus to the place of sanctuary in churches 
and then systematically slaughtered them, these churches became the center 
of the struggle over the creation and preservation of memory. 
To be sure, there are different ways to memorialize genocide. Some advo-
cate excavation of bones and their reburial in order to bring closure for them-
selves and to publicly blame those responsible; others prefer to allow bones to 
lie where they have fallen, in order to remember the vast absences that geno-
cide created never to be lled.37
In the context of this investigation, we have to ask if the collapse of collec-
tive memory was itself among the reasons why and how ethnicity led to geno-
cide. What if 35 years of amnesia, of memories collectively repressed, gave 
rise to these atrocities? And what if failure of the international community to 
intervene to stop the killings makes memory an insufcient tool to guarantee 
that killing will not reoccur?
The writer Benjamin Sehene believes most Rwandans suffer from a lost 
collective memory. He blames Christianity for destroying the memory of a civi-
lization rooted in myths and built on hierarchy, a tyranny but one imbued with 
a sense of restraint. In such an atmosphere things were left unsaid, hatreds 
were self-censored, and three ethnic groups, the Hutus, Tutsis, and Twas, lived 
in peace.38 In 1931, however, the Catholic Church deposed Musinga, the Tutsis’ 
last divine-monarch, because he refused to be converted. They tore into shreds 
all the religious traditions, rituals and myths of the ruling Tutsis—their col-
lective memory and esoteric rights—that were the pillar of Rwandan society.
Just before and after independence in 1962, the Hutus attempted to redress 
the social balance after centuries of feudal domination. They began a bloody re-
volt in 1959, massacring 20,000 Tutsis and forcing thousands to flee into Burundi 
and Uganda. Effecting a transfer of power to a Hutu regime, everything with a 
Tutsi connotation was banned, including some thousand of words cut from the 
36 Pat Caplan: “’Never Again’: Genocide Memorials in Rwanda,” Anthropology Today 23, 1 
(Feb., 2007), pp. 20 – 22,
37 Cornelius Holtorf: “Can less be more? Heritage in the Age of Terrorism.” In: Public Archaeol-
ogy 5, (2006), pp. 101 – 109; quotation: p. 103.
38 Benjamin Sehene: “Rwanda’s Collective Amnesia,” (1999), pp. 1 – 4. www.unesco.org/cou-
rier/1999_l2/uk/dossier/txt08.htm
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language; a quota system was installed allowing only 9% of all positions in higher 
education or civil services to be held by Tutsis. Government and military service 
was restricted as well.
“But a past that is forgotten,” writes Sehene, “is bound to repeat itself be-
cause forgetting involves a refusal to admit wrongdoing. In Rwanda, amnesia 
led to successive pogroms against the Tutsis which began in the l960s and 
ended in their genocide.”39 Subtle points lie awake in the deep structure of 
memory, they rise to the surface time and again, making political power strug-
gles inevitable.
South Africa
In post-conflict societies, it often takes decades to bring individual untold 
memories back from the past, to reconnect these voices with the present. The 
memory problem for South Africa in the 1990s rested on how to remember the 
apartheid period since the regime displayed exemplary techniques of conceal-
ment and silencing. 
Mbuyisa Nikita Makhubu was captured in a photograph carrying in his arms 
the body of Hector Pieterson after the South African police shot and killed the 
13-year-old boy on 16 June 1976 during the Soweto uprising. This photograph 
has become an icon of resistance against apartheid. However, his mother told 
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) another story 
in 1997: her son disappeared in 1977, fleeing from police persecution and has 
never returned. She wanted to know if anyone can bring him back from the 
silence, from no-place: does anyone know what happened to him, how did he 
die, when did he die, where did he die?
With these simple questions revealing her 20 years of pain, she—and many 
other mothers in truth seeking processes—tore the memory of the Soweto up-
rising and apartheid from the process of symbolization, commemoration, and 
39 Ibid., p. 3.
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memorialization and from the collusion of acts of violence with silence, secrecy, 
and lies. She brought memories of the event back into the present by remind-
ing the Commission there were still questions to be answered, memories to be 
listened to, and stories to be told.
Before any process of memorialization can take effect, silencing has to be 
undone. There are many silences in South Africa: some caused by the experi-
ence of trauma that make words fail, others by complicity and guilt that needs 
to hide from the truth. When stories are told from memory and in ofcial ac-
counts, they blend together, both marked and manipulated by the experience of 
violence. How then to start the process of memorialization?
Lebanon
During 16 years of civil war in Lebanon, 1975–1991, oblivion of memory set 
in, many even questioned whether atrocities happened at all or referred to 
the period of war as “a series of nightmares”.40 After the war, a law of general 
amnesty made an attempt to wipe the slate clean without attributing the war 
to any one cause or group; citizens were inhibited from discussing the war less 
their conversations became incitements to sectarian behavior. They were told 
to get on with their lives, and forget the war. Eventually an effort was made to 
‘look the beast in the eye’ and to deal with the memory of war lest it return to 
hold them hostage.41
For some collective amnesia gave way to recall in lms, memoirs, novels, 
poetry, the press, through architectural reconstructions and commemorative 
ceremonies. Others tired of the war, only wanted to forget. And some, believ-
ing there was no shared national history to heal egregious wounds, sought to 
repress memory absolutely, fearing it would give rise to a renewal of war. So 
many prohibitions against recall and remembering, require one to ask how 
40 Sune Haugbølle: “Looking the beast in the eye: Collective memory of the civil war in Lebanon” 
(unpublished Master Studies, St. Antony’s Collective, University of Oxford, June 2002). <www.I 
1 1 101 .net/Writigns/listingwritings.php?typerawcmd=a+Haugbolle.+T-6k>; quotation from 
novelist Ghad Al-Samman (1997) in Aseel Sawalha: “Remembering the Old Good Days: The Re-
construction of Urban Space in Postwar Beirut,” (Unpublished Ph.D. The City University of New 
York, 2002), p. 52.
41 Desmond Tutu seeking truth and reconciliation in post-apartheid South Africa explained 
“None of us have the power to say, ‘Let bygones be bygones’ and, hey presto, they then become 
bygones. Our common experience in fact is the opposite—that the past, far from disappearing or 
lying down and being quiet, is embarrassingly persistent, and will return and haunt us unless it 
has been dealt with adequately. Unless we look the beast in the eye we still nd that it returns to 
hold us hostage.” Quoted by Sune Haugbølle, see note 40, p. 8.
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collective memory is being constructed, how the war is actually talked about, 
and what might be the political and ethical implications of these constructions 
and words.
In the postwar period, sites of remembrance were quickly lost in the down-
town area, once referred to as the ‘center of the country’42 as properties were 
condemned, acquired and leveled, and then reconstructed by a governmental/
private company Société Libanaise pour le dévelopement et la reconstruc-
tion du Centre Ville de Beyrouth (Solidere), spearheaded by the late prime 
minister Raq Hariri.43 
Beginning in 1994, Solidere commissioned well-known international ar-
chitects to give a new face to the city, obliterating more connections to its 
past. The company’s declared aim is to rebuild Beirut as its was before the 
war: “Paris of the Mediterranean” and to replan and rebuild the public space 
where Beirut’s “intercommunal mixing … Christians and Muslims continued 
to meet together at ofcial functions and served on the same committees, 
courts, and mixed tribunals.”44 Solidere’s slogan, “Beirut an ancient city of 
the future,”45 means the restoration of only selected buildings, the preserva-
tion of some facades while changing the functions, use and street plan of the 
whole.46 Still, living in an urban memory of pastiche architecture is not to 
everyone’s liking. 
Beginning in November 1994, the Lebanese press reported, on a nearly 
weekly basis, “the wrecking of mosaics, walls, columns, and other archaeologi-
cal monuments in Beirut. Working around the clock for more than a year, bull-
dozers dug into the city, lling dump trucks that promptly emptied their loads 
into the Mediterranean Sea. More than 7 million cubic feet of ancient Beirut 
have been lost forever.”47 In the end Solidere’s bulldozers leveled more struc-
tures than did the entire civil war. The archaeological strata and the visible 
surviving townscape of the late-Ottoman and early-modern French Mandate 
periods were gone. Some maintain this colonial townscape did not belong to 
Lebanese national patrimony. Only with the rise of memory studies in the last 
20 years, and especially as writers and the media began to lament the hole in 
42 ‘wast al-balad’.
43 Sawalha, see note 40, p. 36.
44 Quoted by Kasper Bloch-Jørgensen, Stine Vijlby Jensen, Metter Vinggaard: “Achieving Recon-
ciliation in Lebanon?” In: International Development Studies, BAS (May 2006), p. 67.
45 “Beirut madina ariqa lil mustaqbal.”
46 Sawalha, see note 40, pp. 73 – 74.
47 Akbert F. H. Naccache: “The Price of Progress” (1996) www.archaeo1ogy.or/9607/abstracts/beirut.html
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memory that Solidere’s erasures produced, has any mention of this history and 
the concept of heritage and patrimony been discussed at all.48
Part IV: Conclusions
Clearly ‘heritage terrorism’, ‘urbicide’ and ‘wars on memory’ or ‘selected 
amnesia’ are unbalanced reactions—they not only threaten the memory and 
material artefacts of individuals and specic groups, they are fraught with 
problematic over-responses when retribution and restitution are provoked.49 
The anonymous destruction and construction, eradication and preservation, 
cannot be neatly separated, one gives rise to the other and both transform the 
sense of the past and places of memory in specic ways.
“Modern memory,” Pierre Nora wrote, “is, above all, archival. It relies en-
tirely on the materiality of the trace, the immediacy of the recording, the vis-
ibility of the image.”50 But who has the right to make the nal selection of what 
material artifacts are preserved and what destroyed, whose memories are nar-
rated and whose obliterated? If memory is considered to be the central me-
dium through which identity is formed—individual, group, or national—then 
has sufcient attention been given to why certain memories are taken up and 
used at specic times?
Because post-conflict reconstruction and remembering never take place in a 
vacuum, a builder of places of memory must be aware of lingering resentments, 
unrecognized privileges, double standards in the treatment of former enemies. 
In recovering from identity violence, memory can be productive or destructive; 
it can lead to renewal of war or peace and must be handled with utmost care.
Memories collected in the public sphere represent a multiplicity of argu-
ments: debatable, contestable, suppressible, includable, and transformable. In 
this contentious complexity, architecture as the archetypal collective memory 
must ask what its practice obscures, suppresses, transforms, what its icons 
and symbols are imputed to signify, and how its processes of memorialization 
are linked to other discourses stored in the archive of memory and time.
48 An essay based on a public lecture presented by Robert Saliba: “Deconstructing Beirut’s 
Reconstruction: 1990 – 2000 Coming to Terms with the Colonial Heritagc” (April 19, 2000). www. 
Csbe.org/Sa1iba-Diwan/essay] .htm
49 See note 37.
50 See note 5, p. 13.
